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While IR’s Eurocentric limits are usually acknowledged, what those limits mean for
theorizing about the international is seldom clarified. In The Global Transformation,
Buzan and Lawson offer a ‘composite approach’ that goes some way towards
addressing IR’s Eurocentrism, challenging existing myths about the emergence and
evolution of the international system and society. This paper seeks to push the
contribution made by Buzan and Lawson in two further directions: first, by
underscoring the need to adopt a deeper understanding of Eurocentrism; and second,
by highlighting how this understanding helps us recognize what is missing from IR
theorizing – conceptions of the international by ‘others’ who also constitute the
international. I illustrate this point by focussing on a landmark text on Ottoman
history, Ortaylı’s The Longest Century of the Empire.
The Global Transformation (TGT) (Buzan and Lawson 2015) offers a
‘composite approach’ to studying world history that understands modernity
not in terms of factors endogenous to ‘Europe’ but as a product of the
‘uneven and combined’ dynamics of the long 19th century. Re-stated in
Said’s (1975, 1993) terms, the ‘composite approach’ constitutes an effort to
study world history by focussing on the multiple ‘beginnings’ of the ‘global
transformation’, as opposed to searching for particular ‘origins’ or ‘origin-
alities’ in ‘Europe’ or elsewhere. As the contributions to this symposium have
also highlighted (albeit in different ways) IR has a long way to go in coming
to terms with its own ‘Eurocentrism’. Against this background, the promise
of Buzan and Lawson’s framework becomes more apparent for those who
specialize in ‘non-European’ parts of the globe and who are contributing to
the project of rendering IR less Eurocentric.
My aim in this paper is to illustrate how Buzan and Lawson’s ‘composite
approach’ could be utilized for rendering IR less Eurocentric by focussing
on a text on Ottoman history by the renowned historian Ortaylı (1983).
Entitled The Longest Century of the Empire, Ortaylı’s text looks at the
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19th century from the perspective of the Ottoman Empire, focussing on the
Ottoman leaders’ perspectives on modernity and their experiences with
modernization in different parts of the Empire. In so doing, Ortaylı argues
against those accounts that conflate Ottoman modernization with the
Empire’s entry into the international society and/or ‘Westernization’.
Modernization and especially reform in the Ottoman Empire has a long
history that was shaped by interactions between various parts of the Empire
and the rest of the world. It was only in the 18th century that permanent
Ottoman Embassies were established in several European capitals (Burçak
2007). The formal recognition of the Ottoman Empire as a member of
international society came in 1856. Notwithstanding the presence, since the
mid-to-late 19th century, of individual Ottoman leaders who called
for Westernization as a solution to the Empire’s decline, the process of
Westernization did not begin in earnest until the declaration of the Republic
of Turkey in 1923.
Bringing in the Ottoman experience, I suggest, both complements and
challenges Buzan and Lawson’s approach. The complementary aspect is in
the way in which the Ottoman experience, as told by Ortaylı, reinforces the
authors’ point about the need for a ‘composite approach’ to studying world
history. The challenge is about the Ottomans’ conceptions of the inter-
national. For the 19th century transformation in the ideational structure of
the international society (as highlighted in TGT) cannot be fully captured
without inquiring into new or non-members’ conceptions of the inter-
national. Such an understanding underscores the need for exploring the
ideas of those who constitute international thought about the international.
As such, I distinguish between tracing ‘European’ origins of thinking about
the social and international (see the contribution to this symposium
by Patricia Owens) and emphasize studying the international as a social
space co-constituted by ‘others’ who also had ideas about the international
(see e.g. Grovogui 2006; Jabri 2014).
Why seek to remedy Eurocentrism in IR?
Rendering IR less Eurocentric has turned out to be a more challenging task
than initially imagined. While IR scholars have, since the mid-1980s,
sought to integrate differently situated approaches (i.e. from outside
Western Europe and North America) into the discipline, IR’s Eurocentrism
has persisted. Arguably, this is because the constitutive effects of
Eurocentrism have not always been attended to (Barkawi and Laffey 2006).
But then, the constitutive effects of Eurocentrism are difficult to address,
for as highlighted by Reus-Smit in his contribution to this symposium,
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while theory builds on history, history is read through theory. Put differently,
addressing the Eurocentric limits of IR involves addressing the Eurocentric
historical accounts that students of IR draw upon. The need to underscore
the fluid, undetermined and intertwined character of world history is also
one of the reasons why Buzan and Lawson engaged in writing a history
of the ‘global transformation’.1 Existing accounts, many of which read
contemporary (‘standard’) concepts back into history end up reinforcing
Eurocentrism in IR.
Two different understandings of Eurocentrism can be found in the IR
literature. The first views Eurocentrism as an ‘erroneous’ approach to world
history. Being Eurocentric in IR is understood as building upon ‘erroneous’
accounts that put ‘Europe’ at the centre of history regardless of whether
‘Europe’ had (yet) become central to world politics or not. The second
understanding approaches Eurocentrism as a ‘consciousness’ that has
allowed erroneous accounts to prevail notwithstanding the availability of
non-Eurocentric historical accounts (Amin 2009 [1989]). Depending on
which conception of Eurocentrism we adopt, Eurocentrism comes across as
less or more of a challenge for IR.
Buzan and Little (2002) built upon understandings of Eurocentrism as
‘world history centred on Europe’ in their appraisal of IR scholarship.
Particularly problematic, Buzan and Little argued, were those aspects of IR
scholarship that put Europe at the centre when studying periods of world
history when Europe was not (yet) at the centre. As such, Buzan and Little
offered an important corrective to IR scholarship that drew upon Euro-
centric accounts of world history. What rendered their critique partial was
the implication of their argument – that putting Europe at the centre of
one’s research may not necessarily be a problem when looking at those
periods of world history when European powers did play central roles in
shaping world politics. In contrast, Grovogui (2006) maintained that
Eurocentrism should not be viewed as a problem that only emerges when
looking at those periods prior to Europe’s ascent. This is because, argued
Hobson (2009), Eurocentrism imposed limitations on research when
studying periods of European ascent as well as the years prior to such
ascent. Hence, the need to go beyond an understanding of Eurocentrism as
‘world history centred on Europe’.
‘Eurocentrism as consciousness’ draws on Amin’s (1989, 154) under-
standing of Eurocentrism as ‘a theory of world history and, departing
from it, a global political project’. This is what Reus-Smit refers to as
1 Also see the burgeoning literature on ‘uneven and combined development’ discussed by
Anievas in his contribution to this symposium.
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‘deep Eurocentrism’ in the opening essay of this symposium. According to
Amin, ‘Eurocentrism as consciousness’ came about during the Renaissance
and especially the age of Enlightenment, as ‘Europe’ sought to make a
break with the past pattern of seeking foundations for knowledge in
religion, looking instead for an anchor in ‘science’. As Bernal (1987) and
Mignolo (2003) have argued (in different ways), ‘Europe’s understanding
of its own history was re-drafted during this period by drawing an
almost straight line from Ancient Greece to modern ‘Europe’, thereby
entrenching a Eurocentric account of world history that understood
‘Europe’ to have developed autonomously, almost without incurring any
debts to ‘others’.
Understanding Eurocentrism as ‘consciousness’ reminds us that being
less Eurocentric is not as easy as looking at the histories of ‘non-European’
peoples. Eurocentrism as consciousness has shaped the history of both
‘Europe’ and the rest of the world. Furthermore, it is through the concepts
developed in/by ‘Europe’ that students of IR make sense of world history.
It is in this sense that Wallerstein (1997) termed as ‘anti-Eurocentric
Eurocentrism’ the efforts of those who seek to point to progress and
modernization outside ‘Europe’ while remaining within these same
conceptual grids. Understanding Eurocentrism as consciousness, then,
helps to underscore how it is not merely our understanding of world history
or the histories of ‘non-European’ peoples that suffer from the limitations of
Eurocentrism. Eurocentrism has constituted a limitation for IR regardless
of whether the story being told is about ‘Europe’ or other parts of the world,
or whether ‘Europe’ at the time was ‘central’ to world politics or not.
The need for a ‘composite approach’: studying ‘beginnings’
One of the contributions of TGT is drawing on different historical accounts
and bringing them together through adopting a ‘composite approach’ to
studying world history. In doing so, Buzan and Lawson distinguish their
approach to world history from Hobson’s (2004) search for The Eastern
Origins of the Western Civilization. Hobson’s study sought to counter
Eurocentrism by (1) pointing to the ‘Eastern’ origins of what are often
portrayed as ‘Western’ achievements; and (2) identifying the ways in which
learning between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ was not unidirectional but
mutual. Buzan and Lawson’s ‘composite approach’, in contrast, points to
the multiple sources of ‘global modernity’. As such, Buzan and Lawson’s
approach to world history could be viewed as having affinities with Said’s
preferred approach to studying ‘beginnings’, and not searching for ‘origins’
or ‘originalities’ (be it ‘Eastern’ or ‘Western’).
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In Beginnings: Intention and Method, Said (1975) sought to adopt
‘beginnings as method’. Whereas studying origins and originalities implied
singular sources for ideas, studying beginnings acknowledged multiple
sources for ideas, and focussed on the process of learning from one another
in their development (Said 1975, 1993). For Said (1993, 217), the multi-
plicity of beginnings served as the basic condition of humankind:
A confused and limiting notion of priority allows that only the original
proponents of an idea can understand and use it. But the history of all
cultures is the history of cultural borrowings. Cultures are not imperme-
able; just as Western science borrowed from Arabs, they had borrowed
from India and Greece. Culture is never just a matter of ownership, of
borrowing and lending with absolute debtors and creditors, but rather of
appropriations, common experiences, and interdependencies of all kinds
among different cultures. This is a universal norm.
Said’s emphasis on the need to make sense of ‘the connections between
things’ helps to address Eurocentrism in both senses of the term. For
example, Said’s 1978 book Orientalism inquires into the Eurocentric
limitations of Oriental Studies (‘Eurocentrism as world history centred on
Europe’) and the ways in which students of Oriental Studies remained
oblivious to those limitations (‘Eurocentrism as consciousness’) (cf. Amin
1989; Hobson 2012). Understood in the context of the study of IR, Said’s
approach to ‘beginnings as method’ highlights the need for studying the
international through drawing upon ‘contrapuntal readings’ that highlight
‘overlapping and intertwined histories’.
Over the years, Said’s call for studying ‘beginnings’ and ‘the connections
between things’ found resonance in the writings of the political theorist
Buck-Morss (2009) on ‘universal history’, the historian Subrahmanyam
(1997) on ‘connected histories’, and the sociologist Bhambra (2007) on
‘connected sociologies’. Buzan and Lawson’s ‘composite approach’ (as with
Reus-Smit’s insistence that choosing one origin or another as a ‘political
act’) could be viewed as a step in this direction insofar as the authors have
produced an account of the history of the 19th century through focussing
on the multiple ‘beginnings’ of the ‘global transformation’ as opposed to
searching for ‘origins’ or ‘originalities’ in ‘Europe’ or elsewhere.
The longest century of the Ottoman Empire
This and the following sections of the paper seek to illustrate how Buzan
and Lawson’s framework could be utilized for rendering IR less Eurocentric
by focussing on Ortaylı’s (1983) The Longest Century of the Empire.
Ortaylı’s threefold focus on the Ottoman leaders’ perspectives on
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modernity in ‘Europe’, intertwined experiences of modernity in different
parts of the Empire and elsewhere in the world, and the ways in which the
Ottoman leaders sought to respond to the ‘rise’ of ‘Europe’ and ‘decline’ of
the Empire highlights the need for studying modernity as a product of the
‘global transformation’ of the 19th century.
According to Ortaylı, Ottoman modernization cannot be reduced
to encounters with the ‘West’ as a notion, or the Empire’s formal entry
into international society in 1856. This is not only because the term
‘Westernization’ did not enter the vocabulary of Ottoman leadership until
the mid-to-late 19th century. More importantly, Ortaylı argues, it is
because modernizing dynamics can be located in different parts of the
Empire, and in different ways well before the 19th century. Ortaylı
acknowledges that the Ottoman Empire was late to modernize its army and
bureaucracy compared with some of its European counterparts, including
Russia. Yet, he also notes that temporal differences need not be translated
into a modernist hierarchy between those who ‘lead’ and others who
‘follow’. Ortaylı points to the economic, social, and political dynamics in
the Empire that were separate from, but related to, dynamics in other parts
of the world. Others such as Mitchell (2000) and Blumi (2011) have also
pointed to the beginnings of modernity in the peripheries of the Empire that
were separate from, but also connected to, dynamics at the imperial core.
Bringing in the Ottoman perspective on modernity as told by Ortaylı
complements Buzan and Lawson’s framework insofar as this account
reinforces the authors’ point about the need for a ‘composite approach’ to
studying world history. In particular, Ortaylı’s account of the Ottoman
experiences of modernization points to the need to inquire into the multiple
beginnings of modernity as opposed to assuming a unidirectional (from the
‘West’ to the ‘rest’) trajectory. Accordingly, Ortaylı’s account also
challenges the ‘multiple modernities’ scholarship that presumes peoples’
disparate experiences with modernity in different parts of the world.2
The challenge: the international through the eyes of ‘Others’
If the section above highlights points of complementarity between TGT and
Ortaylı’s account of Ottoman modernity, his account also presents a chal-
lenge for Buzan and Lawson. The challenge concerns the relative absence
from TGT of others’ conceptions of the international.
Ortaylı does not explicitly discuss Ottoman conceptions of the inter-
national. His account focusses on the ways in which Ottoman leaders’ view
2 On ‘multiple modernities’ see Phillips (2016); cf. Mignolo and Tlostanova (2006).
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of the Empire, ‘Europe’, and the Empire vis-à-vis ‘Europe’ underwent a
transformation during the 19th century. However, one can tease out from
his account a re-shaping of the Ottoman conception of the international
during this period. These changes were taking place in the context of the
Ottoman encounter with international society.
At the risk of oversimplification, it is worth highlighting that at the high
point of Empire, the Ottoman notion of the international rested on a hier-
archical view of the world that was legitimized by a Muslim cosmology,
which placed the Ottomans at the top of the hierarchy as the protector of
Dâr-ül Iṡlâm (abode of Islam). While this cosmology did not demand war
with non-Muslims, it nevertheless placed other world powers on lower
pedestals in relation to the Ottoman self – as evinced by the reception of
‘European’ dignitaries in Iṡtanbul (Yurdusev 2003). However, this hier-
archical view of the world, and its leaders’ ‘equation of foreign policy with
military adventure was … contingent upon Ottoman military superiority’
(Abou-El-Haj 2003). From the late 17th century onwards, as the Empire
experienced one battlefield loss after another, the Ottomans found it
increasingly difficult to hold onto such a hierarchical view of world politics
(Deringil 1998).
Ortaylı’s account highlights the degree to which the Ottoman leaders’
view of the Empire, ‘Europe’ and the Empire vis-à-vis ‘Europe’ had changed
by the beginning of the 19th century. During the ‘longest century of the
Empire’, Ottoman leaders were responding not only to the decline in their
military power, but also to perceptions of this decline in their status vis-à-vis
European great powers, as evinced by the less-than-stellar treatment that
Ottoman ambassadors received in some European capitals (Abou-El-Haj
2003).
The debates surrounding the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire
had left the Ottoman leadership divided as to how to reform the Empire
(Aksan 1993). Resisting the simplified categories of ‘modernizers’ vs.
‘conservatives’, which cannot capture the complexity of Ottoman dynamics,
Ortaylı maintains that Ottoman leaders of this period were a heterogeneous
group united in their efforts to reform various institutions of the Empire.
Indeed, the author insists that the Ottoman leaders housed both kinds of
instincts (‘modernizer’ and ‘conservative’), and that they did not make up
their minds about the project of modernity, or the question of what kind of
modernization efforts were to be pursued by the Empire.
In offering this argument, Ortaylı acknowledges the significance of
encounters with European great powers as the context for the emergence of
Ottoman leaders’ self-understandings about needing to prove the Empire to
be a ‘reformed’ and ‘civilized’ state. He also acknowledges the importance of
various attempts by European great powers to intervene in the affairs of the
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Empire as shaping the self-understandings of the Ottoman leaders. Ortaylı,
nevertheless, underscores the agency of the reformist leaders of the Empire,
who either believed in the project of modernity or embraced modernization
in a utilitarian manner as a form of survival in the face of an international
society that was unwelcoming to theOttomanEmpire even as it accepted it as
a formal member. Their policies vis-à-vis international society, notes Ortaylı,
were designed to minimize great power intervention in the affairs of the
Empire and to make room for military and economic recovery.
Ortaylı’s analysis of the Ottoman leaders’ perspectives on modernity
thereby constitutes a challenge for Buzan and Lawson’s framework by
highlighting the need to inquire into others’ conceptions of the international
when studying how international society changed during the 19th century.
This is partly because dynamics of international society cannot be captured
without paying attention to its relations with new and non-members. As
Neumann has argued, the expansion of the international society needs
reconceptualizing ‘from being a question of expansion to being a relational
question of the entrant going from one system to another’ (2011, 483). That
said, so far, there is little agreement as to the need for, and the methods of,
accessing others’ perspectives.3 I have suggested that IR’s limitations cannot
be addressed merely by ‘adding on’ others’ perspectives as if the ideas and
institutions of humankind in X or Y parts of the world evolved autono-
mously. The Ottoman leaders’ conceptions of the international and their
practices of diplomacy were shaped by, even as they responded to, their
multiple interactions with international society.
Conclusion
Through focussing onOrtaylı’s study of the Ottoman Empire, I have sought
to draw out the implications of Buzan and Lawson’s ‘composite approach’
for addressing IR’s Eurocentric limitations. This ‘composite approach’
allows us to inquire not only into the dynamics that shaped the relations
between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ (Barkawi and Laffey 2006) during the 19th
century, but also the self-understandings of new or non-members vis-à-vis
international society. Inquiring into the international as viewed from the
perspective of ‘others’ would allow further insights into the ideational
structure underpinning international society. The elements of such insights
3 See, for example, the contributions to this symposium by Musgrave and Nexon, and
Braumoeller, cf. Phillips. Arguably, suggesting the absence of a particular type of explanation
before the 19th century (Owens) or calling for ‘exotic international relations’ (Musgrave and
Nexon 2016, authors’ emphasis) is only rendered possible by a discipline that overlooks the very
contributions of those who were previously considered ‘exotic’.
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may be available in ‘micro histories’ (Shilliam 2008), but they have not yet
been brought to bear on macro-studies such as TGT.
The broader consequence of this argument is that IR’s (Eurocentric)
limitations have been constituted by (and constitutive of) the way research
agendas are shaped, by overlooking others’ conceptions of the international
(Bilgin 2016). Incorporating others’ conceptions of the international is not
about adding on their perspectives to existing schemas, but inquiring into
the constitutive relationships between the ‘weak’ and the ‘strong’, and
locating in these relationships the multiple beginnings of the ideas and
institutions of humankind.
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